The (visible) negotiation of an unpopular standard readmission agreement would have jeopardized France`s relations with these countries (i.e. migratory hazards). Secondly, because these third countries have gained a strategic position by participating in the strengthening of control of the EU`s external borders and in the fight against illegal immigration and international terrorism (i.e. empowerment). It would have been difficult, if not counterproductive, to put pressure on these neighbouring (and strategic) third countries to conclude a standard readmission agreement. The growing number of atypical agreements has had some impact on the proliferation of readmission agreements. Today, the network of bilateral readmission agreements has grown considerably, involving more than 100 countries around the world. Chart 2 schematically shows the bilateral readmission agreements between the 27 EU Member States and Iceland, Norway and Switzerland (in blue) on the one hand, and third countries (light green), on the other.  Conversely, Italy, Greece, France and Spain have been confronted with the need to adapt their respective models of cooperation, particularly when it comes to interacting with certain Mediterranean and African countries on the issue of readmission. Past experience has shown that third Mediterranean countries are less likely to enter into standard readmission agreements or even to fully implement them when such agreements have been concluded, due to the potentially disruptive effects of their (visible) obligations on the internal market and social stability, as well as on their external relations with their African neighbours. At the same time, however, other factors have justified these ad hoc adjustments. At the same time, the mobilization of technical expertise has played a key role in maintaining dominant interpretive systems, such as international migration, while legitimizing the prioritization of readmission means of implementation that are usable and cost-effective.